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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
BRIAN DAVID MARTIN,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 43914
ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2015-317
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brian Martin appeals, contending the district court abused its discretion when,
following his guilty pleas to two counts of grand theft, it imposed a sentence with an
excessive fixed term and refused to retain jurisdiction over the case. Both decisions
exceeded the recommendations of the prosecutor and defense counsel. A sufficient
consideration of all the facts in the record reveal that a shorter fixed term and/or a
period of retained jurisdiction would have better served all the goals of sentencing in this
case. As such, this Court should vacate his sentence and remand this case for a new
sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.
should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
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Alternatively, it

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Martin plead guilty to two counts of grand
theft, one count for receiving or transferring title of a stolen truck, and a second count
for borrowing a different truck and not returning it before leaving the state. (R., p.45.)
He agreed to pay restitution for that conduct, as well as for charges which were
dismissed under the agreement. (R., p.45.) In exchange, the State agreed to limit its
underlying sentence recommendation to an aggregate term of twelve years, with three
years fixed (five years, all indeterminate, on Count I, and a consecutive ten year term,
with three years fixed, on Count II). (R., p.45.) At the sentencing hearing, defense
counsel did not offer an alternate recommendation, saying instead, “I think the sentence
is appropriate. I think it would be appropriate to sentence him on a rider.” (Tr., p.13,
Ls.8-10.)1
During the presentence investigation, Mr. Martin admitted that he has had issues
with gambling and abusing Adderall. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), p.17.) However, he also expressed a desire to get treatment for those issues,
particularly the gambling addiction. (PSI, p.17.) Based on those admissions, Mr. Martin
was diagnosed with amphetamine dependence relating to his Adderall abuse and
impulse-control disorder relating to his gambling addiction, as well as alcohol abuse and
generalized anxiety disorder. (GAIN-I evaluation attached to PSI, p.2.) The evaluator
also noted that Mr. Martin expressed amenability to treatment options in that regard.
(GAIN-I, p.3.)

Accordingly, the GAIN-I recommended Mr. Martin participate in

outpatient treatment.

(GAIN-I, p.8; cf. PSI, p.20.)
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A mental health examination

concurred in that recommendation, noting that, “[u]nless evidence exists that contradicts
this information, no follow-up mental health treatment or mental health evaluation is
recommended for this defendant.” (Mental Health Evaluation attached to PSI, p.2.)
However, additional information about Mr. Martin’s mental health issues was
provided by his ex-wife, who reported that Mr. Martin had previously been diagnosed
with paranoid schizophrenia. (Addendum to PSI; see also 2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ284, p.6 (the ex-wife’s statement that, at that time, Mr. Martin had just returned from a
Toledo hospital where he had been diagnosed with psychiatric problems); but see
Mental Health Evaluation, pp.1-2 (indicating Mr. Martin had not disclosed any prior
history of diagnosis or treatment in his self-report).)2 She noted that, Mr. Martin is “a
really good guy when he is on his treatment and a good father.” (Addendum to PSI.)
However, she also expressed her concerns about his ability to be successful on
supervised release. (Addendum to PSI.) The district court concluded that Mr. Martin
did not appear to have any significant mental health issues, viewing his ex-wife’s
statement skeptically because “she’s not a -- as far as I can tell, a licensed
psychologist.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-12.)
The district court ultimately decided to impose an aggregate sentence of ten
years, with five years fixed, on Mr. Martin, consisting of a five-year, wholly-indeterminate
sentence on Count I and a concurrent ten-year sentence, with five years fixed, on Count

While the transcripts are provided in two separate volumes, the volumes are
consecutively paginated.
2 The investigator’s report of the ex-wife’s statement, which was being added to the PSI,
is only one page long. The 2004 Michigan PSI, which was one of two attached to the
current PSI (see PSI, p.21), appears to be comprised of several different forms, and the
page numbers reset with each form. Therefore, the form number will be included in
citations thereto.
1
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II. (Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17, L.2, p.18, Ls.16-23.) It refused to retain jurisdiction, saying,
“I simply don’t know what I would learn on a rider report that would change my view on
the appropriate sentence in this matter.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-7.) Mr. Martin filed a notice of
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.64-66.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court imposed an excessive sentence on Mr. Martin.
ARGUMENT
The District Court Imposed An Excessive Sentence On Mr. Martin
A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Retain Jurisdiction
The decision of whether to retain jurisdiction in a case is a matter submitted to

the discretion of the district court. State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001). That
discretion will not be abused if the district court has sufficient information to determine
that probation would be inappropriate. Id. In this case, however, the information the
district court had, particularly its misunderstanding of the information about Mr. Martin’s
mental health issues and his ability to behave appropriately when properly medicated,
reveals that the district court abused its discretion by not retaining jurisdiction in this
case.
The district court explained the reason it did not retain jurisdiction was “I simply
don’t know what I would learn on a rider report that would change my view on the
appropriate sentence in this matter.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.4-7.) However, the record in this
case shows there was substantial relevant information the district court could
have received from such a report, and that information would speak specifically to
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Mr. Martin’s potential ability to be successful on supervised release if his mental health
issues are properly addressed. As a result, the district court’s justification is flawed.
Specifically, the author of the mental health evaluation was considering only on
the information in the GAIN-I report and Mr. Martin’s self-report.

(Mental Health

Evaluation, pp.1-2.) Accordingly, she was operating on the belief that Mr. Martin had
not been diagnosed with, or treated for, a psychiatric condition previously. (Mental
Health Evaluation, pp.1-2.) Based on that information, she concluded that Mr. Martin
did not need any further mental health treatment or evaluation.

(Mental Health

Evaluation, p.2.) However, she provided an express caveat to that conclusion: “Unless
evidence exists that contradicts this information . . . .” (Mental Health Evaluation, p.2.)
Evidence revealing the incompleteness of that information was provided by Mr. Martin’s
ex-wife. (Addendum to PSI; 2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284, p.6.) Therefore, there was
information about Mr. Martin’s mental health conditions and amenability to treatment
which should have been addressed in the imposition of Mr. Martin’s sentence.
The district court did not do so because it viewed that information with skepticism
based on its concern that the ex-wife was not a licensed psychologist (i.e., that her
personal belief as to what condition Mr. Martin might be suffering was not reliable
because she was not trained in recognizing mental conditions herself).

(Tr., p.16,

Ls.8-12.) That skepticism is wholly misplaced in this case. Mr. Martin’s ex-wife was not
offering her opinion of Mr. Martin’s condition.

For example, she did not say “she

suspected” or “she believed” Mr. Martin was schizophrenic. (See generally Addendum
to PSI.) Rather, she stated, as a matter of fact, that Mr. Martin “was diagnosed as
paranoid schizophrenic” and had been prescribed medication as a result of that
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diagnosis. (Addendum to PSI (emphasis added).) Furthermore, the record shows that
her comment was based on a diagnosis from a medical professional. In her comments
to the 2004 Michigan PSI author, she stated that Mr. Martin had just been diagnosed
with psychiatric problems “while in the Toledo hospital.” (2004 Michigan PSI, CFJ-284,
p.6 (emphasis added).) Thus, the district court’s reason for being skeptical of the exwife’s statement is wholly unfounded. Her statement is not impacted by whether or not
she could diagnosis such conditions herself.

Instead, it reveals that there was a

previous mental health diagnosis, apparently by a licensed professional, and, according
to the mental health evaluation, such information could change the treatment
recommendation.
More importantly to the decision to retain jurisdiction, the ex-wife also indicated
that, if properly medicated, Mr. Martin was capable of behaving appropriately, that he
was “a really good guy when he is on his treatment and a good father.” (Addendum to
PSI.) As it stood, though, she was concerned that Mr. Martin would not be able to
handle supervised release. (Addendum to PSI.) Thus, a rider report could provide
additional information to the district court as to whether Mr. Martin’s mental health
issues could be effectively addressed with medication, such that, with medication, he
would be a good candidate for probation.
The district court needs to consider the defendant’s mental health issues when
making sentencing decisions.

I.C. §19-2523; Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581

(1999). Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that, while the protection
of society may be the primary goal of sentencing, see, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 124
Idaho 497, 500 (1993), rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the
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imposition of the criminal sanction.”

State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971),

superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015).
Therefore, the district court’s decision to foreclose the rehabilitative alternative (an
opportunity that the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the GAIN-I evaluator all
recommended Mr. Martin receive) based on its misunderstanding of Mr. Martin’s mental
health conditions and potential for rehabilitation during a period of retained jurisdiction
constitutes an abuse of its discretion.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Aggregate Sentence
With An Excessive Fixed Term
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory

limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’”

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Martin does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, he must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. Specifically, he contends that the
district court’s decision to impose an aggregate sentence with a five-year fixed term is
excessive given a sufficient consideration of all the mitigating facts in the record.
In addition to the mitigating factors discussed in Section A, supra, Mr. Martin also
took responsibility for his actions and expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing.
(Tr., p.15, Ls.11-13; compare PSI, p.21 (noting that Mr. Martin had not taken
responsibility during the PSI process).) Furthermore, he agreed to pay restitution as
appropriate on both the charged and uncharged conduct.
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(R., pp.45, 63.)

The

Legislature has provided that willingness to pay restitution is a factor the district court is
to consider in mitigation. I.C. § 19-2521(2)(f). Sufficient consideration of the mitigating
factors in this case reveals that the district court’s decision to impose a sentence with a
fixed term two years longer than that recommended by both the prosecutor and defense
counsel also constitutes an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Martin respectfully requests this Court vacate his sentence and remand this
case for a new sentencing hearing where the district court can retain jurisdiction.
Alternatively, it should reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

8

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of June, 2016, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
BRIAN DAVID MARTIN
INMATE #117726
ISCC
PO BOX 70010
BOISE ID 83707
JONATHAN MEDEMA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
TERRY S RATLIFF
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
__________/s/_______________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
BRD/eas

9

